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Introduction 
As an instrument of transitional justice, truth commissions have 
gained considerable popularity in the course of the past three decades. 
This growing popularity has been accompanied by broad debates on 
methodology, justice, and even epistemology. As NGO’s influence grew, 
‘empowerment’ and ‘participation’ became important elements of public 
discourse surrounding a truth commission’s work. Increasingly, this 
influence has led recent truth commissions to adopt corresponding 
policies in search of more inclusive ways of reconstructing history and 
narrating atrocity. Since the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, public hearings have become a common feature of truth 
commissions around the world. Many commissions have held public 
hearings to collect testimony, including, among others, the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commissions in Peru, Liberia and Sierra Leone, the 
Moroccan Equity and Reconciliation Commission, the Greensboro 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission in the USA, the Ghana National 
Reconciliation Commission, and the Commission for Reception, Truth 
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and Reconciliation in East Timor. Without a doubt, testimony and 
public hearings have become increasingly common in these efforts.  
Yet, notwithstanding the growing popularity of public hearings 
and testimony, and in contrast to the considerable body of publications 
concerning issues related to most detailed questions on truth 
commissions and transitional justice in general, public hearings have 
provoked surprisingly little criticism. If at all, critics have stressed 
problems of procedural fairness (Freeman 2006), security (Hayner 
2001), and the like. Some (mostly feminist) theorists have stressed 
gendered expectations and the privileging of rape stories at the expense 
of all other experiences of women survivors (Ross 2001; Theidon 2007). 
Selection processes have also been addressed (Coxshall 2005). 
Nevertheless, to a wide academic and professional community, the 
general democratic value of testimony and public hearings seems to be a 
matter of common sense.  
This paper proposes some second thoughts on testimony and 
public hearings. Based on a recent research project on social rules of 
truth production in the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(hereafter: TRC) (Winter 2008), it seeks to explore the genre of 
testimony as found in public hearings and challenge the hegemonic 
conception of testimony and public hearings as an inherently 
democratic medium of truth production.   
 
“Too far Afield”—Demarcations  
Several kinds of texts have been treated under the terms of 
testimony or testimonio in different branches of research, yet the 
concepts covered by these terms are manifold. Latinamericanists (e.g. 
Beverley 2004; Sklodowska 1996; Sommer 1996; Yúdice 1996) generally 
make use of the Spanish term testimonio, referring to the literary genre 
of testimonial literature. Holocaust researchers also use to speak of 
testimony predominantly referring to written documents (e.g. Waxman 
2006). In some cases, the term is also used to describe survivors’ video 
or audio testimony as collected by the Fortunoff Video Archive for 
Holocaust Testimonies at Yale University, or the Survivors of the Shoah 
Visual History Foundation (Bernard-Donalds and Glejzer 2001; Langer 
1991; Wieviorka 2006), as well as testimony given at the Eichmann trial 
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in Jerusalem (Wieviorka 2006). Recently, human rights organizations 
have also begun to collect video- and audio testimony from survivors of 
violent conflicts, e.g. the project IDP Voices, led in Columbia by the 
Norwegian Refugee Council in cooperation with the Internal 
Displacement Monitoring Center.  
Testimonio or testimony is a historically specific, contextually 
situated and manifold way of truth-telling.1 Elizabeth Jelin (2002: 83) 
pinpoints the emergence of testimony as a central medium of truth-
production to the 1961 Eichmann trial in Jerusalem. Unlike the 
Nuremberg trials, which had relied mainly on written documents for 
evidence, the Eichmann trial was based largely on witness accounts. 
Therefore, for Annette Wieviorka the Eichmann trial marks “the advent 
of the witness” (Wieviorka 2006: 389): “With the Eichmann trial, the 
witness becomes an embodiment of memory (un homme-mémoire), 
attesting to the past and to the continuing presence of the past” (391). 
After World War II, the interest in life narratives increased greatly, 
especially in the global “West” (Schaffer and Smith 2004: 1) and 
narrations of human rights abuse and poverty by “cultural others” and 
“minorities” became especially prized. The “era of testimony” 
(Wieviorka, cited in Jelin 2002: 83), whose point of emergence was the 
Eichmann trial, reached its peak in the 1980s and 1990s, yet continues 
until today. 
 The function ascribed to testimony by Eichmann trial general 
attorney Gideon Hausner provides the basis for its continuing success in 
differing contexts. Unlike written documents, as a medium testimony is 
believed to provide “a living record of a gigantic human and national 
disaster” (Hausner, cited in Wieviorka 2006: 390). It is said to be able 
to reconstruct events in a way “that men would not recoil from the 
narrative as from scalding steam, and so that it would not remain the 
fantastic, unbelievable apparition that emerges from Nazi documents” 
(ibid.). In short: testimony is capable of what ‘sober’ documents fail to 
achieve: “to reach the hearts of men” (ibid.).  
 
                                                
1 By truth-telling I refer to historically and locally specific and 
competitive practices of speech that produce information accepted as true by a 
given reference-group or a given addressee. 
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Analyzing testimony  
 The special attributes ascribed to testimony by general attorney 
Hausner predestine it for use in a truth commission. The concept of 
catharsis, essential part of any truth commission’s vocabulary, points to 
some important differences between trials and truth commissions 
crucial to the application of narrative testimony: while criminal trials 
are primarily directed towards individualized wrongdoers (and thereby 
tend to individualize atrocity), truth commissions address a collective 
subject. This collective subject is generally an entire society, which is 
imagined as ‘sick’ or ‘crazy’ and in need of ‘healing,’ ‘exorcism’ or 
‘purification’ (e.g. Lerner Febres 2002: 7). In contrast to criminal 
proceedings, which seek to restore a normative social order, truth 
commissions (at least officially) aspire to change society in its hitherto 
existing condition. The aim a truth commission seeks to achieve is a 
broad social sensitization and identification with the “Other’s” suffering, 
rather than the deterrence of potential wrongdoers. In this sense, 
Salomón Lerner Febres, the president of the Peruvian TRC, explained 
his commission’s job as “beginning to pave the way, supporting a 
collective, civic reflection” (ibid.).  
Testimony as used in the Peruvian TRC is a special genre that 
cannot be described appropriately in common terms of qualitative 
social scientist research. Earlier, I have listed several forms of speech or 
writing that go under the term of testimony or testimonio in different 
fields of research. Yet the existing reflections on these types of 
testimony are of limited use for a description of testimony as collected 
in a truth commission’s public hearings. Notwithstanding its practical 
popularity, this special type of testimony has attracted little attention in 
critical research. Pursuing this, I wish to propose some general thoughts 
on the kind of testimony applied in a truth commission’s public 
hearings and on the special problems related to this kind of data for 
qualitative social research. These reflections are also of general interest 
to professionals in the sector of transitional justice, as they entail 
implications for truth production by a truth commission. Of course, 
these thoughts make no claim to completeness – I rather wish to inspire 
future debates of the issue.  
Formally, testimony in many ways resembles narrative 
interview as applied extensively in qualitative social scientist research 
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(see e.g. Schütze 1978). It is introduced by an invitation to narrate and 
is only exceptionally interrupted by a commissioner. Regarding its 
general openness in relation to subjects and structures it also resembles 
the narrative interview. Nevertheless, in the case of the Peruvian TRC, 
this openness was limited by the preparation witnesses received before 
giving testimony (I will later resume on the implications of 
institutionalized preparation). As a basic principle, the preparation of 
testimonies is an important interference with its openness and might 
influence a testimony significantly, regarding its content as well as its 
structure. Nevertheless, these preparations are not able to positively 
determine the witnesses’ behavior or the contents of their testimonies. 
Firstly, discourses on ‘giving voice’ that surround truth commissions 
allow for ‘subversive’ speech; and secondly, as power in a truth 
commission is not absolute, speakers always keep a good degree of 
autonomy. 
As any other narration, rather than “positive truth,” testimony 
reveals the ways survivors experienced atrocity, the meanings they 
attribute to their experiences, and the discoursive resources they have 
to make sense of their lives. In this sense, testimonies are documents of 
what Arthur Kleinman et. al. (1997: ix) have termed social suffering, a 
concept that  
brings into a single space an assemblage of human problems that 
have their origins and consequences in the devastating injuries 
that social force can inflict on human experience. Social suffering 
results from what political, economic, and institutional power 
does to people and, reciprocally, from how these forms of power 
themselves influence responses to social problems. (ibid.)  
 
Thereby, social suffering reveals “the interpersonal grounds of 
suffering: in other words, that suffering is a social experience” (ibid.). In 
terms of data, testimony is thus especially valuable for ethno- and 
sociopsychological research on culturally distinctive ways of suffering. 
For reasons I will now explore, testimony is also especially valuable for 
the analysis of social criteria for truth production.  
Any qualitative (and quantitative) analysis needs to pay tribute 
to the way data was produced and the special social, political, and 
psychological circumstances of its production. This is especially true for 
testimony given in a truth commission’s public hearing. I wish to 
reiterate and stress that no way of speaking is more authentic than 
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another, as any speech act is embedded in a specific social context; 
rather, as a historically specific and contested concept, authenticity 
itself is an object of sociological and anthropological research.2 Yet, this 
does not mean that authenticity is not explicitly claimed in testimony 
(Winter 2008). As a discoursive practice, testimony reveals a 
“communicative pattern of production of assertions” (Keller 2005: 229; 
my translation). Thereby it follows certain social rules and conventions 
of speech, which are linked to the special situational context in which a 
testimony is produced, but also to a larger political frame and to the 
speaker’s situation in a given social and global context. It is therefore 
necessary to consider the context of production of the testimony to be 
analyzed, as well as its implications for the speaker.  
First of all, I wish to state that a testimony given in a truth 
commission’s public hearing can not be compared to the participation 
in any opinion poll or study of oral history. To underline the special 
value of testimony as data for research on social rules of truth 
production, let me first explain some important differences by citing 
John Beverley:  
In oral history it is the intentionality of the recorder (...) that is 
dominant, and the resulting text is in some sense “data.” In 
testimonio, by contrast, it is the intentionality of the narrator that 
is paramount. The situation of the narration in testimonio has to 
involve an urgency to communicate, a problem of repression, 
poverty, subalternity, imprisonment, struggle for survival, 
implicated in the act of narration itself. The position of the reader 
of testimonio is akin to that of a jury member in a courtroom. 
(Beverley 2004: 32). 
 
Although Beverley refers to testimonial literature, I believe his point is 
applicable to testimony given in a public hearing as well. In contrast to 
other research contexts—where interviews generally are most helpful to 
the researcher—it is the survivor who depends most urgently on the 
epistemic value listeners or society as a whole attribute to his or her 
narration  in a public hearing. In the Peruvian case, many survivors 
invested a good deal of hope in their testimonies and the TRC’s work 
(Theidon 2007: 459). Researchers who wish to analyze this kind of 
testimony should therefore consider that what is at stake in a public 
hearing is no less than the negotiation of truth and authority -and in 
                                                
2 For a good example of especially interesting research on the 
production and negotiation of authenticity, see the vast body of scholarship on 
indigenousness and indigeneity (e.g. Graham 2002). 
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many cases also economic expectations. This means that stories must 
also be understood as a currency in an economy of transitional justice: 
“Memories were narrated with new possibilities and aspirations in 
mind“ (ibid., 450). In addition, in most cases this negotiation takes 
place after years or even decades of official negation and mystification 
of severe human rights abuse and atrocity. In many cases, victims and 
survivors routinely suffered slander and/or ongoing repression –even 
by members of their very own communities. This implies, as Kimberly 
Theidon aptly suggested on the Peruvian case, that “speaking out“ in 
public may not be an especially relieving experience for survivors, but 
may be a subjectively and objectively dangerous thing to do (ibid., 462; 
Coxshall 2005: 212). On the one hand, testimony must therefore always 
be analyzed as a way for survivors of gaining material or symbolic 
redress for the harm they suffered; but on the other hand and just as 
much, it must be analyzed as a very risky and dangerous speech act that 
may result in further humiliation in an extremely sensitive issue, as 
rape, torture, the loss of goods and chattels, or the killing of loved ones 
are. For these reasons and in contrast to a popular cliché, testimony is 
not an especially spontaneous or authentic genre of speech—it should 
be interpreted instead as a narration which is carefully adapted to the 
special and subjectively dangerous situation of a public hearing and the 
hopes and fears the speaker invests in it. 
For the reasons explained above I suggest that testimony is most 
valuable for researchers who wish to explore social and cultural 
concepts of truth and criteria for truth production. I propose that 
testimony—more than other types of interviews—reveals conceptions of 
truth and aspects of experience that survivors (as social subjects) deem 
convincing in relation to hegemonic discourses of truth production. 
Possible positionings and strategies of speech are not fixed or 
determined, though, but may vary in relation to the speakers situation 
in society. At the same moment, a testimony’s blanks, ruptures, and 
breaks may serve to mark those topics and positionings that survivors in 
a certain social and discoursive context feel to be too risky (Theidon 
2004: 110). The same is true for the way commissioners deal with 
narrations that do not fit neatly into hegemonic discourse. Attempts to 
“normalize” or “smoothe” “deviant” narrations might mark the 
dependence of socially accepted truth from its submission under 
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historically specific forms of speech and positioning. Testimony is 
therefore helpful data for researchers who wish to inquire into problems 
of social truth production and the possibilities of subaltern speech.  
 
Testimony in transitional justice: giving voice to the voiceless? 
No truth commission is invariably able to produce certain specific forms 
of speech. Narrative interview as a genre is often believed to generate 
what Schütze termed the “dynamics of narration” [Zugzwänge des 
Erzählens] (Schütze 1978: 4), yet this rather deterministic assertion 
calls for specification. The process of subjectivation is more comparable 
to an act of relating to relations of power and domination than to an 
interpellation in an Althusserian sense (Althusser 1977). Narrative 
interview as well as testimony certainly interpellate a subject in a 
certain way, yet they will not determine his or her response. Testimony 
does not only allow for secrets to be kept and for the negation of 
complete declarations (however these might be possible)—indeed these 
voluntary silences take place regularly (Beverley 2004: 38; on silence in 
transitional justice, see also Coxshall 2005). Subtle omissions and 
ruptures as well as open refusals to speak may be found in many 
testimonies. Rigoberta Menchú reminds us of the (self-set) limits of the 
confessional imperative: “I’m still keeping secret what I think no one 
should know. Not even anthropologists or intellectuals, no matter how 
many books they have, can find out all our secrets” (Rigoberta Menchú, 
cited in Beveley 2004: 38).  
In this sense, although testimony facilitates certain discourses and 
disencourages others, it should not be interpreted as an obedient 
medium determined by hegemonic discourse or by dynamics inherent 
to its genre. Is this to say, however, that testimony is a subversive 
medium instead? Subaltern Studies have interpreted testimony as a 
political genre of speech. John Beverley states that:  
It has to do with how people who are marginalized, repressed, and 
exploited (...) use something like testimonio for their purposes: 
that is, as a weapon, a way of fighting back. (...) To recall Marx’s 
well-known distinction, testimonio aspires not only to interpret 
the world but also to change it. (Beverley 2004: xvi) 
 
The speaker, Beverly writes, positions him—or herself as a subject in a 
collective (subaltern) situation and situates his or her personal history 
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in a given social setting of inequality (ibid., 33, 41). He explains the 
meaning of testimony as follows:  
What is at stake in testimonio is not so much truth from or about 
the other as the truth of the other. What I mean by this is the 
recognition not only that the other exists as something outside 
ourselves, not subject to our will or desires, but also of the other’s 
sense of what is true and what is false. (ibid., 7) 
 
The political character of testimony implies its potential for subversion. 
For Beverley, testimony marks a point of departure for adressing and 
destabilizing hegemonic discourse, power relations, and the unequal 
distribution of speech. In his eyes, testimony is an “interpellation from 
the subaltern” rather than—in an Althusserian sense—an interpellation 
of the subaltern:“So there are also moments in testimonio when we hear 
something that doesn’t fit with our sense of political or ethical 
correctness. These moments summon us to a new kind of relationship 
with others, a new kind of politics” (ibid., 2). 
 In this sense, survivors and witnesses may be interpreted as 
competent experts for social relations of power and domination by 
holding a specific everyday knowledge of relations between speech and 
language/power. This is most true for the Peruvian case I investigated, 
where culturalist constructions of linguistic difference are paramount to 
relations of social power. Discourses of giving voice to the voiceless and 
empowerment, which sourround a truth commission’s work, may 
further support the subversive potential of testimony and, at the same 
moment, deconstruct the power relations inherent to these discourses. 
Nevertheless, there is little need for euphoria. Testimony’s 
condition as a predominantly subaltern genre demarcates its 
limitations. It should not be forgotten that—in the Peruvian case—only 
to a very limited degree it was up to an individual’s own decision which 
genre of speech he or she would choose; in reality, there was little choice 
at all: institutional discrimination (the implicit reservation of higher, 
objectifying positions for members of hegemonic social groups) not only 
established testimony as a genuinely subaltern genre, but also made it 
the only genre available to members of subaltern groups on an 
institutional level. The formal openness of testimony was limited as 
well; in the first instance, stories had to match certain criteria to be 
considered for presentation in a public hearing. During the public 
hearings, commissioners did not hesitate to react promptly (and at 
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times harshly) when confronted with survivors who would not accept 
the limitations of time or content set by the commissioners, thereby 
exposing the power relations that are inextricably interwoven with the 
politics of testimony. As a result, the credo of giving voice to the 
voiceless implicitly included the possibility of withdrawing voice if not 
used “properly.” The one thing that was clearly not intended, however, 
was the self-contained taking of voice.  
Public hearings staged by the Peruvian TRC were highly 
ritualized events. They invariably began with a formal invitation voiced 
by the commission’s chair, Dr. Salomón Lerner Febres, a well respected 
philosopher and the president of a prestigious private limeño university. 
Subsequently, the witness would be put under oath of “telling the truth 
and only the truth,” followed by a short address of welcome and an 
honoring of his or her willingness to retell and share traumatic 
experiences. People who were perceived to be Indigenous were told to 
feel free to testimonialize “in Quechua, in Spanish, just as you feel most 
comfortable” (Beatriz Alva Hart, in Abarca Ortíz and Chumbes Abarca 
2002). Finally, the word would officially be handed over to the survivor 
in exchange for his or her story: “Please, if you could now give us your 
testimony” (ibid.). Data from a broad range of documents suggests that 
this stiff formality was intended to provide a dignified framing and to 
signal respect for the survivors’ stories. Notwithstanding these noble 
intentions, in some cases the commissioners’ clinging to the official 
protocol resulted in cutting short those who either wouldn’t wait to be 
given voice or—resulting in even greater irritation—wouldn’t accept the 
time and topic limits imposed on their voice. Let me cite a telling 
example from the Huamanga hearings to clarify my point. 
Paulina Abarca Ortíz, a Quechua speaking woman from the 
small highland community of Paccha, and her son, Marcelino Chumbes 
Abarca, were invited to attend a public hearing in the city of Huamanga 
(Ayacucho), one of the places most painfully and cruelly affected by the 
armed conflict.3 They self-identified as survivors of a long, bloody 
                                                
3 The Peruvian TRC estimated that some 38 out of 100 victims of the 
armed conflict died or “disappeared” in the –quite sparsely populated– 
department of Ayacucho. In a stunning calculation, the TRC stated that “if all 
Peruvians had been Ayacuchanos” there would not have been an estimated 
69.280, but some 1.2 million deaths to be bemoaned (TRC 2003: 53). More 
recent excavations of unreported mass graves indicate that the actual numbers 
are probably even higher. 
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history of both state and insurgent repression, as well as of arduous 
resistance and intracommunity violence, rendering Marcelino a half-
orphan when he was still a child, and Paulina a widow and single 
mother of five, an event she recalled to have felt “like a raptor taking a 
hen which has poults” (Chumbes Abarca and Abarca Ortíz 2002; my 
translation). Both Paulina and Marcelino placed the killings within a 
much wider frame of governmental neglect and indifference, so that 
their testimony by far exceeded the narrow frame of what is usually 
understood by political violence and could best be termed a narration of 
social suffering (Kleinman et. al. 1997). Paulina Abarca and Marcelino 
Chumbes were obviously well aware of the power relations that 
structured speech in Peruvian society and the poor value placed on their 
peoples and—especially—their language. Yet, seemingly, they were also 
aware of the politics of empowerment and knew how to make use of the 
ambivalent discourses surrounding them.  
Marcelino Chumbes began his eloquent testimony by rejecting 
notions of voicelessness and, in Quechua, informing the commissioners 
that he and his people indeed had a voice—yet one many in the 
audience proved unable to understand, this not being an expression of 
his own linguistic incompetence, but of that of the monolingually 
Spanish speaking part of the audience:  
We peasants do indeed speak—in Quechua! This is just the way it 
is. Because of this/ because of this at the countryside they even 
read in Quechua! (...) In other countries, Japanese (sic.), Chile, 
Brasil, the mistis [mestizos]—they can’t understand. (Chumbes 
Abarca and Abarca Ortíz 2002; my translation).  
 
(Interestingly, the interpreter reduced his initial statement to the 
matter-of-fact assertion “We peasants speak Quechua”). He went on 
drawing a positive image of campesino identity as hardworking, 
suffering, and culturally distinctive people before he began to narrate in 
great detail the tragedy of his community. After an hour or so, the 
session’s leading commissioner, Beatriz Alva Hart, interrupted 
Marcelino Chumbes and thanked him and Paulina for giving testimony, 
but Marcelino asked her for “just a bit, señora, just a bit.” Subsequently, 
Paulina and Marcelino would substantially extend the time limits set by 
the commissioners, filling their extra time with claims to reparation and 
urging politicians to keep their promises and to once and for all 
implement existing laws. Their repeated yet disarming and charmingly 
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performed refusal to stop talking first produced irritation and 
helplessness among the comissioners (and laughter among the public) 
and ultimately overt agression. Paulina Abarca wouldn’t stop talking 
until being interrupted brutally by a commissioner silencing her in 
Quechua and appropriating thus her legitimating ethnic strategy: “Don’t 
repeat any more! Stop declaring, will you? We have understood you very 
well. Is this clear?” (Alberto Morote Sánchez, in Chumbes Abarca and 
Abarca Ortíz 2002). Interestingly enough, the interpreter wouldn’t 
translate the commissioner’s command, thereby holding this telling 
exposure of hidden power structures back from the monolingually 
Spanish speaking part of the audience. 
The incidence is especially troubling because of the hegemonic 
discourse of giving voice to the voiceless. Actually, the commissioner 
Beatriz Alva Hart had initiated the session by telling the witnesses that  
for us, the testimony that you are going to offer us is very 
important, not just for the work we are doing by investigating the 
truth, but because we want everybody to listen to what has 
happened to you. Be sure that we are going to listen to you very 
attentively and with an open heart!” (Beatriz Alva Hart in: 
Chumbes Abarca and Abarca Ortíz 2002; my translation)  
 
Obviously, the economies of speech included some hidden restrictions 
that were only exposed in an unexpected situation of deviant behaviour. 
Part of this deviance was in fact the very act of bringing one’s own voice 
instead of accepting the one offered by the Commission with all its 
limitations. By speaking in Quechua and ignoring commands in 
Spanish, Marcelino Chumbes and Paulina Abarca subverted the ethnic 
rules of speech and effectively rendered the commissioners voiceless. 
The scene shows how even in a situation that is supposed to provide a 
dignified context and overcome racist and culturalist power structures, 
such hierarchies prevail.  
At this point, the economies of speech that are deeply intervowen 
with the young tradition of truth commissions as an instrument of 
transitional justice become visible: truth commissions have often 
claimed to give voice to the voiceless and thereby reconstructed 
fundamentally unequal relationships between commissioners and 
survivors from the beginning. The economies of speech expressed in the 
claim to give voice to the voiceless not only imply the exclusion of 
survivors from a truth commission’s institutional level (after all, how is 
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someone supposed to give a voice, who doesn’t even seem to have one 
him- or herself?); the claim also uncritically reproduces constructions of 
linguistic (in-)competence and the image of the voice- and speechless 
indigenous (woman) extensively criticized in feminist and postcolonial 
theory. It thereby masks the social construction of racialized and 
gendered linguistic incompetence exposed by Marcelino Chumbes’ 
speech. Surely, voicelessness was meant to be interpreted in the 
Spivakian sense, meaning that “even when the subaltern makes an 
effort to death to speak, she is not able to be heard, and speaking and 
hearing complete the speech act” (Spivak 1996, 292). Yet I still don’t 
find this notion very helpful, as it locates lack inside those who are 
denied participation, not inside those who deny.  
Linguistic incompetence was also present in the prestructuring 
offered to witnesses and survivors in the run-up to the public hearings. 
The necessity of preparing the testimony in advance was explained by 
the commission with reference to the “complexity of the [survivors’] 
repertoire and narrative strategy” (TRC, not dated, 2.4). This “richness” 
was supposed to “meet efficiently the limitations of time (…) as well as 
the necessity to serve the narration’s educational aspect toward the 
nation” (ibid., 2.4). In the course of the preparations, the witness was 
expected to rehearse the “clear presentation of information regarding 
the incidents,” as well as of the “meaning attributed to the incidents by 
the victims.” Yet, in no case psychologists should prepare a “script” that 
might serve “interest(s) others than those of the victim” (ibid., 2.4). 
Thereby the TRC defined the potentially contradictory requirement for 
the preparation of the testimonies to achieve “clarity and efficiency of 
the public presentation” without “affecting the victims’ right to present 
their own points of view and to apply their own narrative strategies” 
(ibid., 2.4). The ideal of reconcilability of a “clear” and “efficient” 
narration with the formulation of “the victims’ own points of view” and 
the “meaning attributed to the incidents by the victims” was not 
questioned. Instead, coherence and positive translatability were taken 
for granted, which fell short of the subjective messiness of a conflictive 
experience. Experience and attribution of meanings were implied to be 
unambiguous and identical, which resulted in the construction of a fixed 
identity of the narrating person. In consequence, the productive effects 
of incoherence and irritation were given up in favor of a “plain” 
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narration and witnesses were asked to “make sense” by adopting 
hegemonic narrative structures.  
Finally, the alleged voicelessness of survivors of racism and 
human rights abuse also implies differences in authorized genres of 
speech and general validity of the truth produced. While testimony was 
introduced as a genuinely subaltern genre based on notions of 
subjective and personal truth, in the Peruvian TRC commissioners and 
staff were authorized to give declarations and scientific explanations, 
using a hegemonic scientific language and producing thus “objective” 
truth detached from their unmarked bodies. They even expressly 
claimed absolute neutrality and disinterested, impartial morality 
(Lerner Febres 2002: 7; Winter 2008). Finally, the act of giving voice to 
the voiceless reserves the ultimate possibility of taking it away if used 
in an “improper” way. That this is not just an academic quibbling 
became sadly obvious in the case of Paulina Abarca and Marcelino 
Chumbes. The Peruvian TRC thus reproduced patterns of social 
hegemony and subalternity by assigning distinct positions and 
restricting the strategies of speech available to survivors and witnesses; 
testimony served as a tool for the reproduction of these patterns. 
 
Conclusion 
Annette Wieviorka cites Fréderic Gaussen as saying that “the 
idea has taken hold that all lives equally deserve to be told” (Gaussen, 
cited in Wieviorka 2006: 391). She adds: “What Gaussen describes is a 
democratization of historical actors, an attempt to give voice to the 
excluded, the unimportant, the voiceless.” (Wieviorka 2006: 391). Yet 
the affirmation that all lives deserve to be told neither means that all 
narrations are equally accepted, nor that power relations between 
speakers disappear. Testimony given in a truth commission’s public 
hearings is thus a genre of speech available to members of subaltern 
groups. Yet at the same time it demarcates a no-go-zone—a position 
subalterns must not reclaim to speak from. In the Peruvian case, such 
was (among others) the objectifying position of a commissioner. 
Exclusions were justified by pointing to hegemonic conceptions of truth, 
that linked objectivity to unmarked and allegedly unaffected situations 
(Winter 2008). In consequence, testimony as a subaltern genre also 
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implies a fixation of available modi of truth production: the “subjective” 
and “individual” truth that testimony is meant to offer stands in stark 
contrast to the “objective” and (potentially) penally, historically, and 
scientifically “relevant” truth of a truth commission’s final report. Yet 
these differences are generally taken for granted and rarely questioned. 
Testimony may well open ways for hitherto unheard narrations 
and, to a limited degree, even allow for negotiations and redefenitions 
of established truths (Schaffer and Smith 2004); yet, as long as 
testimony is not accompanied by an opening of more powerful genres of 
speech to subaltern people, it undermines its very own democratic 
standards. In the end, what was handed over to the President in a 
solemn ceremony was not a collection of testimonies, but twelve heavy 
volumes of written word—the truth commission’s final report. This 
report may also most probably be the one authoritative document 
historians, anthropologists, and sociologists will refer to in the future. 
As such, truth is ultimately being represented by this written document, 
not by testimony. I would like to remind readers of Gayatri Spivak’s 
plea for subaltern spaces to disappear: “We cannot forget that working 
for the subaltern means the subaltern’s insertion into citizenship, 
whatever that might mean, and thus the undoing of subaltern space” 
(Spivak 1996: 307). Thus, genres of speech explicitly reserved and 
established for subaltern voices only serve as a fig-leave. They foster 
resubalternization and rather add to stabilizing and legitimizing, than to 
overcoming, inequality.  
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